Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption

Kenju Kamei, Louis Putterman, Katy Tabero and Jean-Robert Tyran
Additional contact information
Katy Tabero: University of Southampton

No 2024-025, Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series from Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University

Abstract: Corruption is the great disease of government. It undermines the efficiency of the public sector in many countries around the world. We experimentally study civic engagement (CE) as a constraint on corruption when incentives are stacked against providing CE. We show that CE is powerful in curbing corruption when citizens can encourage each other to provide CE through social approval. Social approval induces strategic complementarity among conditional cooperators which counteracts the strategic substitutability (which tends to limit beneficial effects of CE) built into our design. We also show that civic engagement in the lab is correlated with civic engagement in the field, and that the effects of social approval are surprisingly robust to framing in our setting.

Keywords: Corruption; Civic engagement; Public sector; Public goods; Social approval (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D73 D91 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
Date: 2024-12-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
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https://ies.keio.ac.jp/upload/DP2024-025_EN.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption (2024)
Working Paper: Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:keo:dpaper:2024-025

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