Asymmetric welfare implication between a small number of leaders and a small number of followers in Stackelberg models

Hiroaki Ino () and Toshihiro Matsumura
Additional contact information
Hiroaki Ino: School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

No 98, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: We investigate a Stackelberg oligopoly model in which m leaders and N-m followers compete. We find an asymmetric welfare implication of the Stackelberg model. Introducing a small number of leaders into the Cournot model can reduce welfare. However, introducing a small number of followers into the Cournot model always improves welfare. The key result behind this asymmetry is contrasting limit results in the cases where m → 0 and m → N. We also discuss the optimal number of leaders and the integer constraint for the number of the firms.

Keywords: multiple leaders; Stackelberg; Cournot; limit result; integer constraint; convex cost (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2013-01, Revised 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-com
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp098.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:098

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Toshihiro Okada ().