Mixed Oligopoly and Privatization in General Equilibrium

Kenji Fujiwara ()

No 137, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: Making use of a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with private and public firms, this paper examines the welfare effects of privatization. We show that in an exogenous market structure privatizing the public firm necessarily reduces welfare, which contrasts with the existing result that some degree of privatization is optimal. In contrast, we find that privatization has no effect on welfare in an endogenous market structure with free entry of private firms.

Keywords: Partial privatization; General oligopolistic equilibrium; Exogenous market structure; Endogenous market structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L32 L33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2015-12, Revised 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-ind
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:137

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