Patent Protection and Public Capital Accumulation

Ken Tabata

No 192, Discussion Paper Series from School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract: This paper examines the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy in a growth model where the engines of economic growth are private R&D and public capital accumulation. The government allocates tax revenue between new investment and maintenance expenditure for public capital. We consider how the balanced-growth maximizing public investment policy changes as patent protection becomes stronger, as seen in many countries. The results show that as patent protection becomes stronger, the income tax rate to finance public investment should be lower and the expenditure share of new investment should be higher. The balanced-growth maximizing policy leads to a smaller government, as patent protection becomes stronger.

Keywords: Patent Protection; Public Capital; Economic Growth; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2019-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-gro and nep-ipr
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http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp192.pdf First version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Patent protection and public capital accumulation (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kgu:wpaper:192

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