'Hiding behind a small cake' in a newspaper dictator game

Axel Ockenfels and Peter Werner

No 51, Working Paper Series in Economics from University of Cologne, Department of Economics

Abstract: We conduct an Internet dictator game experiment in collaboration with the popular German Sunday paper "Welt am Sonntag", employing a wider and more representative subject pool than standard laboratory experiments. Recipients either knew or did not know the size of the cake distributed by the dictator. We find that, in case of incomplete information, some dictators 'hide behind the small cake', supporting the notion that some agents' beliefs directly enter the social utility function.

Keywords: dictator game; psychological games; incomplete information; newspaper experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-02-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: ‘Hiding behind a small cake’ in a newspaper dictator game (2012)
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