The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests

Gerald Eisenkopf

No 2013-06, Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz

Abstract: The heterogeneous effort supply in intergroup contests explains why groups have a manager. However, the objectives of group managers and members often differ. Using data from an experiment this paper studies whether this conflict of interests affects leadership effectiveness. The managers have an advisory role only and cannot change the monetary incentives of the group members in any context. Depending on the treatment some managers prefer more competition than the group members, some less, and some do not have any incentive at all. The results show that managers can coordinate their groups rather effectively. Their incentives shape the competitive behavior of the 'subordinates'. However group members follow the non-binding investment recommendations of their group manager more closely if management compensation is not incentivized.

Keywords: Communication; Experiment; Rent-seeking; Management compensation; Group decision making (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D72 D74 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2013-03-26
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hrm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/FuF/wiwi/workingpaperseries/WP_06-Eisenkopf_2013.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:knz:dpteco:1306

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://www.wiwi.uni-konstanz.de/en

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office Ursprung ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).