Unequal Incentives and Perceived Fairness in Groups

Gerald Eisenkopf ()
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Gerald Eisenkopf: Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, Germany

No 2015-03, Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz

Abstract: In many groups heterogeneous incentives induce people to make unequal contributions to a common pool. This paper studies whether people consider the random assignment of such unequal incentives as unequal opportunities and demand more egalitarian distributions of the pool. The aggregate experimental results show that low contributors do not make such consideration if their incentive scheme provided opportunities for private gains in case of low contributions. When incentives induce lower contributions in order to avoid private losses, some people increase their claim but these increases are lower than in the case of unequal opportunities. Meanwhile high contributors reward low contributors if they do not follow incentives.

Keywords: Distributive Justice; Unequal Incentives; Experiment; Entitlements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 C91 D03 D31 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 58 pages
Date: 2015-01-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hrm
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