How do voters react to complex choices in a direct democracy? Evidence from Switzerland

Zohal Hessami

No 2016-01, Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz from Department of Economics, University of Konstanz

Abstract: Direct democracy may impose significant information demands on voters especially when individual propositions are highly complex. Yet, it remains theoretically ambiguous how proposition complexity affects referendum outcomes. To explore this question, I use a novel dataset on 153 Swiss federal referendums that took place between 1978 and 2010. The dataset includes hand collected data on the number of subjects per proposition based on official prereferendum information booklets as a measure of complexity. My estimation results suggest that the relationship between proposition complexity and the share of yes-votes follows an inverse U-shape. Using micro-data from representative post-referendum surveys, I provide evidence for two opposing channels. More complex propositions are supported by a more diverse group of voters. On the other hand, voters find it more difficult to estimate the personal consequences of complex propositions and are therefore more likely to reject them.

Keywords: Direct democracy; Complexity; Voting behavior; Random errors; Political economy of reforms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D78 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 77 pages
Date: 2016-01-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (26)

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Journal Article: How Do Voters React to Complex Choices in a Direct Democracy? Evidence from Switzerland (2016)
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