Greenhouse-gas Emission Controls and International Carbon Leakage through Trade Liberalization
Jota Ishikawa and
Toshihiro Okubo
No 231, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University
Abstract:
This paper studies greenhouse-gas (GHG) emission controls in the presence of carbon leakage through international firm relocation. The Kyoto Protocol requires developed countries to reduce GHG emissions by a certain amount. Comparing emission quotas with emission taxes, we show that taxes coupled with lower trade costs facilitate more firm relocations than quotas do, causing more international carbon leakage. Thus, if a country is concerned about global emissions, emission quotas would be adopted to mitigate the carbon leakage. Firm relocation entails a trade-off between trade liberalization and emission regulations. Emission regulations may be hampered by trade liberalization, and vice versa.
Keywords: Trade liberalization; Global warming; Kyoto Protocol; Emission tax; Emission quota; Carbon leakage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F18 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2008-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-env
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/dp231.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Greenhouse-Gas Emission Controls and International Carbon Leakage through Trade Liberalization (2009)
Working Paper: Greenhouse-gas Emission Controls and International Carbon Leakage through Trade Liberalization (2008)
Working Paper: Greenhouse-gas Emission Controls and International Carbon Leakage through Trade Liberalization (2008)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kob:dpaper:231
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University 2-1 Rokkodai, Nada, Kobe 657-8501 JAPAN. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Office of Promoting Research Collaboration, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University (kenjo@rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp).