Capital Controls and Welfare
Shigeto Kitano
No DP2010-01, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University
Abstract:
This paper computes welfare levels under different degree of capital controls and compares them with the welfare level under perfect capital mobility by using the methodology of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007). We show that perfect capital mobility is not always optimal and that capital controls may enhance an economy's welfare level. There exists an optimal degree of capital-account restriction that achieves a higher level of welfare than that under perfect capital mobility, if the economy has costly financial intermediaries. The results of our analysis imply that as the domestic financial intermediaries are less efficient, the government should impose stricter capital controls in the form of a tax on foreign borrowing.
Keywords: Capital controls; Welfare; DSGE; Small open economy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2010-01, Revised 2011-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge and nep-opm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)
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https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2010-01.pdf Revised version, 2011 (application/pdf)
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Journal Article: Capital controls and welfare (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2010-01
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