Reporting of Internal Control Deficiencies, Restatements, and Management Forecasts

Katsuhiko Muramiya and Tomomi Takada
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Tomomi Takada: Graduate School of Business Administration, Kobe University, Japan

No DP2010-32, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: We examine the relationship between accuracy in management forecasts and the effectiveness of internal controls by using the unique setting in Japan, where disclosing management forecasts is effectively mandated. Feng et al. (2009) posit and find that managers of firms reporting internal control weaknesses under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) report less accurate earnings forecasts compared with other firms in the U.S., where management forecasts are disclosed voluntarily. In line with this notion, our results show that firms disclosing internal control deficiencies and those restating financial highlights report less accurate management forecasts in the Japanese market, where the disclosure of management forecasts are effectively mandated. Furthermore, we find that manager's optimistic biases cause such inaccurate management forecasts. Our results indicate that the effectiveness of internal controls has a significant impact on internal reports, which are used in forming forecasts; therefore, internal control weaknesses induce less accurate management forecasts.

Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2010-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-for
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