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The Effect of Anchoring on Dishonest Behavior

Hiromasa Takahashi and Junyi Shen
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Hiromasa Takahashi: Faculty of International Studies, Hiroshima City University

No DP2018-04, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: This study conducts experiments on dishonest behavior after anchoring the participants' expected reward to investigate the effect of anchoring on dishonest behavior. The experimental results show that those who are anchored to high reward behave less honestly than those anchored to low reward. This is because the anchoring changes participants' expected reward. Such a change in expected reward serve as participants' reference point to affect the likelihood of facing a loss frame where dishonest behaviors are more likely to occur.

Keywords: Anchoring effect; Reference point; Dishonest behavior; Expected reward; Cheating; Risk attitude (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D91 G41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-upt
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https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2018-04.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

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