Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex Post Equilibria with Private Values

Makoto Hagiwara

No DP2019-13, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: We consider the implementation problem under incomplete information and private values. We investigate double implementability of (single-valued) mappings in dominant strategy equilibria and ex post equilibria. We call a mapping a "rule". We show that the notion of an ex post equilibrium is weaker than the notion of a dominant strategy equilibrium. Then, this double implementability notion is not trivial even under private values. We define a new strategic axiom that is stronger than "strategy-proofness", but weaker than "secure strategy-proofness". We call it "weak secure-strategy-proofness". We show that a rule is doubly implementable if and only if it is weakly securely-strategy-proof.

Keywords: Double Implementation; Dominant Strategy Equilibrium; Ex Post Equilibrium; Weak Secure-strategy-proofness; Private Values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2019-06, Revised 2019-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2019-13.pdf Revised version, 2019 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2019-13

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