Endowments-swapping-proofness and Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets

Di Feng
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Di Feng: Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Laussane, SWITZERLAND and Junir Research Fellow, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, JAPAN

No DP2023-14, Discussion Paper Series from Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University

Abstract: For Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), Fujinaka and Wakayama (2018) propose a new incentive property, endowments-swapping-proofness, that excludes manipulations that a pair of agents can conduct before the operation of the selected mechanism by swapping their endowments. We investigate endowments-swapping-proofness for Moulin (1995)'s multiple-type housing markets, which are an extension of Shapley-Scarf housing markets with multi-unit demands. Differing from Shapley-Scarf housing markets, for multiple-type housing markets, there are various ways to swap endowments. Motivated by this observation, we introduce three extensions of endowments-swapping-proofness: bundle endowments-swapping-proofness, one type endowments-swapping-proofness, and flexible endowments-swapping-proofness. Based on the first two weaker endowments-swapping-proofness properties that we propose, and other well-studied properties (individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness), on several domains of preference profiles, we provide characterizations of two extensions of the top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism: the bundle top-trading cycles (bTTC) mechanism and the coordinatewise top-trading-cycles (cTTC) mechanism. Moreover, we also show that the strongest possible endowments-swapping-proofness property (flexible endowments-swapping-proofness) leads to an impossibility. Furthermore, our results explicitly show that our new properties correspond to efficiency notions.

Keywords: Multiple-type housing markets; Endowments-swapping-proofness; Strategy proofness; Constrained efficiency; Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism; Market designy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 72 pages
Date: 2023-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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