Social Image in Public Goods Provision with Real Effort

Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Erkut Ozbay

Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers from Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum

Abstract: We study public goods game where the contribution efforts are observable. When the players are observed, they contribute more and free-riding diminishes significantly. On the other hand, presence of an audience does not affect the performance of players if there is no strategic aspect of the game, i.e. when they play private goods game. The findings are in line with the predictions of the social image theory where a player’s contribution is also a signal to an audience regarding how much she cares about contributing to the public goods.

Keywords: Conditional; CAPM (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-pbe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/erf_wp_1026.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden (http://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/erf_wp_1026.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://eaf.ku.edu.tr/sites/eaf.ku.edu.tr/files/erf_wp_1026.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:koc:wpaper:1026

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers from Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sumru Oz ().