Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention

Ismail Saglam, Mehmet Gurdal and Ayca Ozdogan ()
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Ayca Ozdogan: TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics

Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers from Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum

Abstract: Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.

Keywords: Strategic information transmission; truth-telling; trust; sender-receiver game. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2011-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Truth-Telling and Trust in Sender-Receiver Games with Intervention (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:koc:wpaper:1123

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