On the Existence of Mixed Strategy Nash equilibria

Pavlo Prokopovych and Nicholas C.Yannelis ()
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Nicholas C.Yannelis: Department of Economics, Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa

No 50, Discussion Papers from Kyiv School of Economics

Abstract: The focus of this paper is on developing geometric sufficient conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for both diagonally transfer continuous and better-reply secure games. First, we show that employing the concept of diagonal transfer continuity in place of better-reply security might be advantageous when the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is concerned. Then, we study equilibrium existence in better-reply secure games possessing a payoff secure mixed extension. With the aid of an example we show that such games need not have mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We provide some easily verifiable conditions for the mixed extension of a two-person game that is reciprocally upper semicontinuous and uniformly payoff secure to be better-reply secure.

Keywords: Discontinuous game; Diagonally transfer continuous game; Better-reply secure game; Mixed strategy equilibrium; Transfer lower semicontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
Note: Submitted to Journal of Mathematical Economics
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Journal Article: On the existence of mixed strategy Nash equilibria (2014)
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