The Causes of Fiscal Transparency: Evidence from the American States
James E. Alt,
David Lassen and
Shanna Rose
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James E. Alt: Department of Government, Harvard University
Shanna Rose: Department of Political Science, State University of New York (SUNY) - Stony Brook
No 06-02, EPRU Working Paper Series from Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics
Abstract:
We use unique panel data on the evolution of transparent budget procedures in the American states over the past three decades to explore the political and economic determinants of fiscal transparency. Our case studies and quantitative analysis suggest that both politics and fiscal policy outcomes influence the level of transparency. More equal political competition and power sharing are associated with both greater levels of fiscal transparency and increases in fiscal transparency during the sample period. Political polarization and past fiscal conditions, in particular state government debt and budget imbalance, also appear to affect the level of transparency.
JEL-codes: D72 D78 H70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (49)
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