Peer Evaluation Tournaments

Martin Dufwenberg, Katja Goerlitz and Christina Gravert
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Martin Dufwenberg: Department of Economics, University of Arizona
Katja Goerlitz: University of Applied Labour Studies

No 24-20, CEBI working paper series from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. The Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI)

Abstract: Peer evaluation tournaments are common in academia, the arts, and corporate environments. They make use of the expert knowledge that academics or team members have in assessing their peers performance. However, rampant opportunities for cheating may throw a wrench in the process unless, somehow, players have a preference for honest reporting. Building on Dufwenberg and Dufwenbergs (2018) theory of perceived cheating aversion, we develop a multi-player model in which players balance the utility of winning against the disutility of being identified as a cheater. We derive a set of predictions, and test these in a controlled laboratory experiment.

Keywords: psychological game; cheating; tournaments; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 51
Date: 2024-12-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hrm, nep-spo and nep-upt
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