Is Economic Analysis of Any Help in Studies of Legitimacy in the EU?

Jan Gunnarsson
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Jan Gunnarsson: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 04-32, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The transaction cost approach in economics has been applied in theorizing how Europe is governed. In providing a functionalist explanation of political organization, it encourages beliefs that reforms improving organizational efficiency also increase the legitimacy of European leadership. This paper discusses institutional perspectives on how democratic legitimacy is built by those, who aspire to rule the EU. An economist’s view will be discussed against a background of models of legitimacy by Scharpf and Schmitter. In addition, a governance practice directed to diffusion policy is fenced off and a future empirical study is outlined.

Keywords: legitimacy; multi-level governance; transaction costs; social norms; institutional leverage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H70 L50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2004-09, Revised 2004-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-pbe and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0432

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