The Origins of Governments: From Amorphy to Anarchy and Hierarchy

Matthew Baker, Erwin Bulte and Jacob Weisdorf

No 06-25, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally “switch” from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society’s surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be “trapped” at lower levels of technology – perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model’s main predictions.

Keywords: origins of institutions; common defense; raiding; hunter-gatherers; SCCS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 N4 O10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2006/0625.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0625

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics Oester Farimagsgade 5, Building 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen K., Denmark. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Thomas Hoffmann (thho@kb.dk).