Competition in Soccer Leagues

Bodil Olai Hansen and Mich Tvede
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Bodil Olai Hansen: Copenhagen Business School

No 07-31, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: In the present paper a model of competition between sports clubs in a sports league is presented. Clubs are endowed with initial players but at a cost clubs are able to sell their initial players and buy new players. The results are that: if the quality of players is one-dimensional, then equilibria in pure strategies exist, and; if the quality of players is multi-dimensional, then there need not exist equilibria in pure strategies, but equilibria in mixed strategies exist. Equilibria in mixed strategies resemblance signings on deadline day in european soccer.

Keywords: competition between sports clubs; dimension of quality of players; equilibrium in pure strategies; equilibrium in mixed strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D21 L83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 10 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-spo
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0731

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