Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains

Joseph Abdou and Hans Keiding
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Hans Keiding: Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 08-1, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a strategic game form using the concept of an interaction sheaf. The latter assigns to each open set of outcomes a set of interaction arrays, specifying the changes that coalitions can make if outcome belongs to this open set. The interaction sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions, depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding (2003).

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; strong equilibrium; solvability; effectivity; acyclicity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2008-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2008/0812.pdf/ (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction Sheaves on Continuous Domains (2009)
Working Paper: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2008)
Working Paper: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2008)
Working Paper: Interaction sheaves on continuous domains (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0812

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