n-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solution

Jens Hougaard () and Mich Tvede

No 10-21, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called "efficient proportional solutions" are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.

Keywords: n-person non-convex bargaining; proportional solutions; egalitarian solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: n-Person Nonconvex Bargaining: Efficient Proportional Solutions (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1021

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