Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India

Thomas Markussen

No 10-26, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: Political parties can be vehicles for economic and social development in poor countries. They can also serve as rent seeking instruments. Uncovering how parties function is therefore key to establishing the preconditions for good governance. The paper discusses when and why clientelism on the basis of party affiliation may arise. Operationally, party-based clientelism is defined as a bias of public policy in favour of members of the governing political party. In a sample of local governments in India, party-based clientelism is shown to exist in two out of four states and to be strongly affected by economic inequality.

Keywords: decentralization; patronage; clientelism; inequality; poverty; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 H7 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2010-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Inequality and Political Clientelism: Evidence from South India (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1026

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