Second Thoughts on Free Riding

Ulrik H. Nielsen, Jean-Robert Tyran and Erik Wengström
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Ulrik H. Nielsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen University

No 13-08, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.

Keywords: Response Time; Free Riding; Public Goods; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C90 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2013-09-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-pub
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Related works:
Journal Article: Second thoughts on free riding (2014)
Working Paper: Second Thoughts on Free Riding (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1308

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