Fairness is Intuitive

Alexander Cappelen, Ulrik H. Nielsen, Bertil Tungodden, Jean-Robert Tyran and Erik Wengström
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Ulrik H. Nielsen: Department of Economics, Copenhagen University

No 14-10, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we provide new evidence showing that fair behavior is intuitive to most people. We find a strong association between a short response time and fair behavior in the dictator game. This association is robust to controls that take account of the fact that response time might be affected by the decision-maker's cognitive ability and swiftness. The experiment was conducted with a large and heterogeneous sample recruited from the general population in Denmark. We find a striking similarity in the association between response time and fair behavior across groups in the society, which suggests that the predisposition to act fairly is a general human trait.

Keywords: Response Time; Dictator Game; Experiment; Fairness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D03 D60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2014-04-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-neu
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/dp_2014/1410.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Fairness is intuitive (2016)
Working Paper: Fairness is intuitive (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1410

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