Voter Motivation and the Quality of Democratic Choice

Lydia Mechtenberg and Jean-Robert Tyran

No 16-13, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: The quality of democratic choice critically depends on voter motivation, i.e. on voters’ willingness to cast an informed vote. If voters are motivated, voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant, delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes. We experimentally study a common interest situation in which we vary voters’ information cost and the competence of the expert. We find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects.

Keywords: voting; experiment; information acquisition; information aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2016-09-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice (2019)
Working Paper: Voter Motivation and the Quality of Democratic Choice (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1613

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