Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy

Rupert Sausgruber, Axel Sonntag and Jean-Robert Tyran

No 19-08, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: We experimentally study the disincentive effect of taxing work and redistributing tax revenues when redistribution is imposed vs. democratically chosen in a vote. We find a "dividend of democracy" in the sense that the disincentive effect is substantially smaller when redistribution is chosen in a vote than when it is imposed. Redistribution seems to be more legitimate, and hence less demotivating, when accepted in a vote.

Keywords: Redistribution; disincentive effect; voting; legitimacy; realeffort task; lab experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D31 D72 H23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2019-06-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-ltv and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Disincentives from redistribution: evidence on a dividend of democracy (2021)
Working Paper: Disincentives from Redistribution: Evidence on a Dividend of Democracy (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1908

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