Self-Signaling in Moral Voting

Lydia Mechtenberg, Grischa Perino, Nicolas Treich, Jean-Robert Tyran and Stephanie Wang

No 21-01, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper presents a two-wave survey experiment on self-image concerns in moral voting. We elicit votes on the so-called Horncow Initiative. This initiative required subsidization of farmers who refrain from dehorning. We investigate how non-consequentialist and non-deontological messages changing the moral self-signaling value of a Yes vote affect selection and processing of consequentialist information, and reported voting behavior. We find that a message enhancing the self-signaling value of a Yes vote is effective: voters agree more with arguments in favor of the initiative, anticipate more frequently voting in favor, and report more frequently having voted in favor of the initiative.

Keywords: moral bias; voting; multi-wave field experiment; information avoidance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D72 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Self-Signaling in Moral Voting (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:2101

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