Allocations Dynamically Implemented in Renegotiation Proof Equilibrium

Hans Keiding
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Hans Keiding: Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen

No 95-10, Discussion Papers from University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics

Abstract: An important result of Hurwicz [2] states that a performance correspondence assigning Pareto optimal allocations to exchange equilibria, which is Nash implementable, must be the Walras equilibrium correspondence. In the present paper, this result is extended to economies over time with the associated notion of dynamical implementation. It is shown that if the performance correspondence is implementable in renegotiation proof Nash equilibrium, then it must be the Walras equilibrium correspondence. Some applications of this result are considered.

Pages: 13 pages
Date: 1995-06
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kud:kuiedp:9510

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