Fairness Ideals, Hidden Selfishness and Opportunist Behavior:An Experimental Approach

Natsuka Tokumaru

Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics Project Center, Kyoto University

Abstract: Economic experiments have shown that human incentives are not only limited to the profit-maximizing principle but also motivated by fairness. Those studies presuppose that individuals commit to fixed value systems and that experimental institutions invoke fairness ideals. This paper shows that participants strategically select fairness ideals advantageous for self-distribution. Participants whose relative earnings are higher than those of their pairs adhere to a liberalist fairness ideal, whereas those with lower relative earnings prefer an egalitarian distribution of money. This reflects that individuals commit opportunistic behavior as a result of resolving a cognitive dissonance between material utility and fairness.

Keywords: Economic Experiment; Fairness Ideals; Cognitive Dissonance; Hidden Selfishness; Opportunistic Behavior Economic experiments have shown that human incentives are not only limited to the profit-maximizing principle but also motivated by fairness. Those studies presuppose that individuals commit to fixed value systems and that experimental institutions invoke fairness ideals. This paper shows that participants strategically select fairness ideals advantageous for self-distribution. Participants whose relative earnings are higher than those of their pairs adhere to a liberalist fairness ideal; whereas those with lower relative earnings prefer an egalitarian distribution of money. This reflects that individuals commit opportunistic behavior as a result of resolving a cognitive dissonance between material utility and fairness.; Economic Experiment; Fairness Ideals; Cognitive Dissonance; Hidden Selfishness; Opportunistic Behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-upt
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