Crowding in School Choice

William Phan (), Ryan Tierney and Yu Zhou

Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University

Abstract: We consider the problem of matching students to schools when students are able to express preferences over crowding. For example, schools have varying per capita expenditures, average teacherstudent ratios, etc. These characteristics of a school are now endogenously determined—matchings with more students to a particular school decrease each of the variables above. We propose a new equilibrium notion, the Rationing Crowding Equilibrium (RCE), that accommodates crowding, noenvy, and respect for priorities. We prove the existence of RCE under mild domain conditions, and establish a Rural Hospitals Theorem and welfare lattice result on the set of RCE. The latter implies the existence of a maximal RCE, and that such RCE are studentoptimal. Moreover, the mechanism defined by selection from the maximal RCE correspondence is strategyproof. We also identify an algorithm to find a maximal RCE for a natural subdomain.

Keywords: School; choice; with; crowding;; Rationing; crowding; equilibrium;; Student; optimality;Strategyproofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D62 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2021-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-mic and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Crowding in School Choice (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kue:epaper:e-21-006

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