Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money

Masahiro Kawasaki, Ryosuke Sakai and Tomoya Kazumura

Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University

Abstract: We study consistency in multi-unit object allocation problems with money. Objects are identical and each agent has a multi-demand and quasi-linear preferences. We consider the class of weak object monotonic preferences and that of single-peaked preferences. We first show that on those domains, if a rule satisfies consistency, strategyproofness, individual rationality, no subsidy, non-wasteful tie-breaking, and minimal tradability, then it is a sequential dictatorship rule. Since not all sequential dictatorship rule are strategy-proof and consistent, we then focus on a specific class of sequential dictatorship rules which we call sequential dictatorship rules with lowest tie-breaking. On the weakly object monotonic domain, when the reservation prices are increasing in the number of objects, sequential dictatorship rules with lowest tie-breaking satisfy consistency and independence of unallocated objects if and only if there is a common priority ordering for more than one object and this is an acyclic ordering of the priority ordering for one object. We also show that this condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for a sequential dictatorship rule with lowest tie-breaking to satisfy consistency and independence of unallocated objects on the single-peaked domain.

Keywords: Consistency; Strategy-proofness; sequential dictatorship rule; serial dictatorship rule; weakly object monotonic preferences; single-peaked preferences; acyclicity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D61 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dp/papers/e-23-007-V2.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kue:epaper:e-23-007-v2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion papers from Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Graduate School of Economics Project Center ().