The State in Russia's Banking Sector

Victor Gorshkov ()
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Victor Gorshkov: Faculty of International Liberal Arts, Kaichi International University

No 1015, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: Russia’s banking sector has increasingly become more nationalized and monopolized in recent years as the result of the Central Bank of Russia’s policies. In the present paper, we have demonstrated how policies of the Bank of Russia since 2013 have enhanced the level of nationalization and monopolization of Russia’s banking sector and have provided even more favorable conditions for state-controlled banks. The paper outlined the ‘clearance campaign’ of the Central Bank of Russia and summarized major disturbing trends, such as the increased amount of license revocations, the split within the Association of Russian banks, enhanced state support towards state-controlled banks, that are reshaping the institutional structure of Russia’s banking sector. The strengthening of supervisory and regulatory functions of the Bank of Russia can be viewed as a positive sign as they help create the healthy environment within the sector and aim to establish market discipline, however, current policies simultaneously cause significant market distortions and further suppress competition.

Keywords: Russia; state; banking sector (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O16 P29 P52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12pages
Date: 2019-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cis and nep-tra
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