Communication Enhancement through Information Acquisition by Uninformed Player

Yasuyuki Miyahara () and Hitoshi Sadakane
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Yasuyuki Miyahara: Kobe University

No 1050, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: We analyze a situation in which an uninformed decision maker can gather information about states by paying a cost before communicating with an informed sender. We focus on multidimensional information gathering: the decision maker can determine how much time to allocate to gather information about each state. It is shown that communication can be enhanced under multidimensional information gathering compared with no information gathering. We also characterize the optimal investigation, which specifies the state the decision maker gathers information about. Our result demonstrates an advantage of multidimensional information gathering over single-dimensional information gathering.

Keywords: Cheap talk; Communication; Multidimensional information gathering; Strategic information transmission Technology choice; CES production function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 43pages
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ore
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