Agreeable Bets with Multiple Priors

Atsushi Kajii and Takashi Ui

No 581, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: This paper considers a two agent model of trade with multiple priors. First, we characterize the existence of an agreeable bet on some event in terms of the set of priors. It is then shown that the existence of an agreeable bet on some event is a strictly stronger condition than the existence of an agreeable trade, whereas the two conditions are equivalent in the standard Bayesian framework. Secondly, we show that the two conditions are equivalent when the set of priors is the core of a convex capacity.

Keywords: multiple priors; convex capacity; agreeing and disagreeing; Choquet integralm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 6 pages
Date: 2004-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Agreeable bets with multiple priors (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kyo:wpaper:581

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