Bargaining Set and Anonymous Core without the Monotonicity Assumption

Chiaki Hara ()

No 599, KIER Working Papers from Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research

Abstract: We give an example of an atomless exchange economy in which consumers'preference relations are not monotone and in which the bargaining set of Mas-Colell (1989) consists of all allocations satisfying resource constraints, although the set of all Walrasian equilibrium allocations, the core, and the anonymous core of Hara (2002) are all empty. We also give an equivalence theorem for the anonymous core when the preference relations may not be monotone.

Keywords: Atomless exchange economies; core; bargaining set; anonymous core; equivalence theorems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 D41 D51 D82 Q53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2004-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Journal Article: Bargaining set and anonymous core without the monotonicity assumption (2005)
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