Spatial concessions with limited tenure

Nicolas Querou, Agnes Tomini and Christopher Costello

Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier

Abstract: We examine theoretically a system of spatially-connected natural resource concessions with limited tenure. The resource migrates around the system and thus induces a spatial externality, so complete decentralization will not solve the tragedy of the commons. We analyze a system in which conces-sions can be renewed, but only if their owners maintain resource stocks above a pre-defined target. We show that this instrument improves upon the decentralized property right solution and can replicate (under general conditions) the socially optimal extraction path in every patch, in perpetu-ity. The duration of tenure and the dispersal of the resource play pivotal roles in whether this instrument achieves the socially optimal outcome, and sustains cooperation of all concessionaires.

Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2016-01
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Related works:
Working Paper: Spatial concessions with limited tenure (2016)
Working Paper: Spatial concessions with limited tenure (2015)
Working Paper: Spatial concessions with limited tenure (2014)
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