Designing Water Markets to Manage Coupled Externalities: a Preliminary Analysis
Sophie Legras (sophie.legras@dijon.inra.fr) and
Robert Lifran
Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier
Abstract:
This paper aims to investigate different water market designs to accommodate coupled externalities in the context of irrigation-induced salinity. It provides a preliminary analysis of three types of market mechanisms, involving diversion rights and recharge rights.
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2006-11, Revised 2006-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr
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http://www.lameta.univ-montp1.fr/Documents/DR2006-11.pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:06-11
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