Multi-Unit Auctions and Competition Stricture

Raphaële Préget () and Sophie Thoyer ()

Working Papers from LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier

Abstract: Is it better for a seller who wants to auction multiple units to face many small bidders or few large bidders? Since multi-unit auction models usually have many equilibria, there are no theoretical predictions on the impact of the competition structure on the performance of a multi-unit auction (in terms of expected revenue and allocation efficiency). Our experimental results with uniform-price auctions support that with a constant competition degree (identical aggregate demand and supply), when the number of bidders increases while individual demand decreases, there is less strategic bidding (demand reduction). It leads to higher expected revenue with a lower variance but allocation efficiency is not significantly different.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2009-12, Revised 2009-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lam:wpaper:09-18

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