A Fine Collection: The Political Budget Cycle of Traffic Enforcement

Emanuele Bracco

No 209919534, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: With data from 1998 to 2015, we find evidence that before elections Italian mayors issue fewer tickets and collect a lower proportion of issued fines. This provides evidence that mayors strategically use both tax setting and collection to affect elections.

Keywords: Political Budget Cycle; parking tickets; tax collection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H26 H71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-pol and nep-tre
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Related works:
Journal Article: A fine collection: The political budget cycle of traffic enforcement (2018)
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