Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection
Chrysostomos Tabakis and
Maurizio Zanardi
No 220851297, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department
Abstract:
Are preferential trade agreements (PTAs) stumbling blocks or building blocks towards multilateral trade liberalization? We address this question by investigating the effects of the negotiation and implementation of PTAs on the use of antidumping (AD) (i.e., the most common form of contingent trade protection) by member countries against non-members, as there has been a concurrent surge in regionalism and AD activity since the 1990s. Theoretically-derived empirical predictions are supported by the empirical analysis based on the 15 most intense users of AD. The results demonstrate that both the negotiation and the implementation of PTAs lead to fewer AD measures against non-member countries, except for members of customs-union agreements in force facing large import surges from non-members. Thus, our results highlight a building-block effect of PTAs on multilateral trade cooperation when it comes to AD protection.
Keywords: Preferential trade agreements; antidumping; multilateral cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 F14 F15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)
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Related works:
Journal Article: Preferential trade agreements and antidumping protection (2019)
Working Paper: Preferential Trade Agreements and Antidumping Protection (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:220851297
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