Tax Evasion, Embezzlement and Public Good Provision

Chowdhury Mohammad S Anwar, Alexander Matros and Sonali Sen Gupta

No 232397285, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: This paper presents a model that links tax evasion, embezzlement, and the public good provision and suggests how they are interrelated. We characterize the conditions for three types of Nash equilibria: tax evasion, embezzlement, and efficient public good provision.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Embezzlement; Corruption; Audits; Sanctions; Public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 D83 H40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue, nep-mic, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-univers ... casterWP2018_004.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:232397285

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Giorgio Motta ().