Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue

Klenio Barbosa, Dakshina De Silva, Liyu Yang and Hisayuki Yoshimoto

No 267027285, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: This paper exploits a large-size auction experiment conducted by two Chinese Government Treasury security issuers -the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank- to investigate whether Treasury securities should be sold through uniform or discriminatory auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 Treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that auction outcome yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different, suggesting revenue equivalence. This equivalence is robust across different revenue measurements and participation behavior.

Keywords: Treasury Security Auctions; Discriminatory Auctions; Uniform Auctions; Revenue Equivalence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 C58 D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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