Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample

Zhixin Dai, Jiwei Zheng and Daniel Zizzo

No 305138067, Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department

Abstract: We present a coordination game experiment testing the robustness of the predictive power of level-k reasoning and team reasoning in a sample of Chinese tax administrators that is matched for likely socio-economic characteristics with our student sample. We show how the incidence of coordination game play is virtually identical between Chinese tax administrators and university students. However, relatively to non-students, students are comparatively more attracted by the focal point under team reasoning when this has equal payoffs and the other outcomes do not.

Keywords: external validity; non-student sample; focal points; team reasoning; level-k; coordination games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-univers ... casterWP2020_017.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a matched non-student sample (2024)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lan:wpaper:305138067

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Giorgio Motta ().