Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments

Pierre Salmon

No 2003-03, LEG - Document de travail - Economie from LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne

Abstract: Intergovernmental yardstick competition is based on voters comparing the performance of their own elected government with what obtains in other jurisdictions. This mechanism can produce results that are favourable to voters but it may also be the case that it has consequences that are not favourable. Both cases are given some attention in the essay. Some of their implications for the assignment of powers in the European Union are then derived.

JEL-codes: D72 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2003-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eec, nep-mfd and nep-pbe
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick competition among governments (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lat:legeco:2003-03

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