Blocks, Liquidity, and Corporate Control

Patrick Bolton and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie from Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie

Abstract: The paper develops a simple model of optimal corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analysed.

Keywords: ownership structure; corporate control; liquidity; ownership concentration; block pricing; free rider problem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G12 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 1996-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Published in The Journal of Finance, vol.53 (1), Feb.1998, pp. 1-25

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Related works:
Working Paper: Blocks, liquidity and corporate control (1996)
Working Paper: Blocks, liquidity and corporate control (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lau:crdeep:9619

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