Equilibrium and Optimal R&D Roles in a Mixed Market

Vasileios Zikos

Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics, Loughborough University

Abstract: This is the first paper to investigate the timing of the R&D decisions in a mixed market. Considering a model in which a public firm competes against a private one, we examine the desirable (welfare-maximizing) and the equilibrium R&D role of the public firm. Our results suggest that from a social point of view, the public firm should carry out its investment as a Stackelberg follower. Using the observable delay game of Hamilton and Slutsky [Games and Economic Behavior 2 (1990) 29], we show that the public firm may play this desirable role.

Keywords: Endogenous timing; R&D; Stackelberg; mixed market. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L31 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-02, Revised 2007-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ec/RePEc/lbo/lbowps/R&D_Roles.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ec/RePEc/lbo/lbowps/R&D_Roles.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.lboro.ac.uk/departments/ec/RePEc/lbo/lbowps/R&D_Roles.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:lbo:lbowps:2007_08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Paper Series from Department of Economics, Loughborough University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Huw Edwards ().