Group formation and governance

Ludovic Renou

No 07/07, Discussion Papers in Economics from Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester

Abstract: This paper studies the impact of the governance of a group, whether be it unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority, on its size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that not only unanimity might favor the formation of larger groups than majority, but also a change of status quo. This paper therefore suggests that unanimity, often blamed for the European inertia of the last two decades, was only a scapegoat.

Keywords: groups; coalitions; alliances; endogenous formation; cost reduction; loss of control; governance; unanimity; majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Group Formation and Governance (2011)
Working Paper: Group formation and governance (2008)
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